DEFINING AN "INVESTMENT CONTRACT"
FOR PURPOSES OF ALASKA BLUE SKY LAW:
HAVE THE ALASKA COURTS STRETCHED
THEIR TEST BEYOND MEANINGFUL
APPLICATION?
I. INTRODUCTION
Courts have focused upon the term "investment contract" to
sweep novel forms of public financing which evade the letter, but not
the spirit of the state and federal securities laws, within the ambit of
such laws.1 The Alaska courts have broadly construed the tests developed in the federal circuit courts to determine whether an investment
scheme constitutes an investment contract. Demonstrating a desire to
protect unsophisticated and unwitting investors, the Alaska courts
have stretched these tests to hold that gold mining schemes, vending
sales contracts, and territorial distributorships 2 may be securities sub-

ject to regulation by Alaska's Blue Sky laws. 3 This note will compare

the Alaska courts' criteria for determining whether an investment contract exists with the criteria of other courts. In order to protect unsophisticated investors from fraudulent investment schemes, the Alaska
courts have loosely construed the tests developed by other courts,
stretching such tests beyond previous interpretations. This note will
consider an alternative test that the courts might invoke to make this
determination: the "risk capital" test. This alternative test would allow the courts to reach similar results, while providing a clearer rationale for their decisions. A clearer rationale would facilitate the
planning of transactions under state securities laws by enabling attorneys to more readily predict what type of transaction will be deemed
an investment contract, and therefore, a security subject to Blue Sky
regulation.
Copyright © 1985 by Alaska Law Review
1. See Hannan & Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in
Defining FederalSecurites, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 219, 223-24 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Hannan & Thomas].
2. See American Gold & Diamond Corp. v. Kirkpatrick, 678 P.2d 1343 (Alaska
1984); Hentzner v. State, 613 P.2d 821 (Alaska 1980); Wheeler v. State, 659 P.2d 1241
(Alaska App. 1983).
3. State securities laws are commonly referred to as "Blue Sky" laws. Alaska's
Blue Sky laws are codified at ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.55.010-.270 (1980).
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Since the various tests for determining whether an investment
contract is a security have developed primarily through judicial con-

struction of the federal securities laws, this note will first consider investment contract tests used by the the Supreme Court and the federal
circuit courts.4 This note will then analyze the three cases in which
the Alaska courts have decided whether innovative investment
schemes constituted a security. Finally, this note will consider

whether Alaska should adopt the Ninth Circuit's "risk capital" approach. Adoption of the risk capital test would be consistent with the
Alaska court's previous investment contract decisions and Alaska's
Blue Sky laws. In addition, this test would allow the court to reach

the results it desires without stretching the analysis found in decisions
of the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit.

II.

DEFINING AN INVESTMENT CONTRACT: HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT

Both the federal securities laws and the Alaska Blue Sky laws
include within the definition of a security "any note, stock. . . certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement...
investment contract . . . or, in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a 'security'."' 5 The Alaska legislature has added

to the federal securities la* definition by including the "investment of
money or money's worth including goods furnished or services performed in the risk capital of a venture with the expectation of some
benefit to the investor where the investor has no direct control over the
'
investment or policy decision of the venture."6
The federal courts have developed tests for determining whether
4. In particular, since Alaska has adopted the Ninth Circuit's profits test, the
historical development section of this note will focus upon the Ninth Circuit and
Supreme Court case law. Although federal law and interpretations thereof are not
controlling, federal judicial precedents may assist Alaska courts in interpreting terms
in the definition of a security, because Alaska's Blue Sky laws have been modeled after
the federal securities statutes.
5. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 22, § 2(1), 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1982)) ("33 Act"); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Pub. L. No. 291, § 3(a)(10), 48 Stat. 883-84 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(10) (1964)) ("34 Act"); Alaska Securities Act of 1959, ALASKA STAT.
§ 45.55.130(12) (1980).
6. ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.130(12) (1980). Before 1933, securities regulation was
the exclusive province of the states. Congress borrowed extensively from previously
enacted state Blue Sky laws when it defined the term "security" in the Securities Act
of 1933. See Hannan & Thomas, supra note 1, at 220. Section 401(1) of the Uniform
Securities Act defines a security in terms modeled after the 1933 Act. UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 401(1), 7B U.L.A. 580 (1985). When Alaska enacted its state securities
laws, it modeled its definition of a security after the definition suggested in the Uniform Securities Act. See 1961 Op. Att'y Gen. 15.
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an investment scheme is an investment contract within the meaning of
the federal securities laws. State courts, in interpreting their own state
securities laws, generally have adopted the tests developed by the
Supreme Court and7 the subsequent federal circuit court interpretations of these tests.
In Securities Exchange Commission v. WJ. Howey Co.,8 the
Supreme Court enunciated the often-cited "Howey test" for determining whether an investment scheme constitutes an investment contract
and, therefore, a security for purposes of federal securities laws. The
Howey test became the basis for later formulations of investment contract tests.
The Howey Court stated that the term "investment contract" denotes "a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his
money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from
the efforts of the promoter or a third party." 9 Applying this test, the
Court found the existence of an investment contract in a scheme where
a Florida company sold parcels of citrus grove property primarily to
persons not residing in Florida. The company recommended that the
buyers obtain a service contract with a second company; both companies, however, were under direct common control and management.10
In evaluating these circumstances, the Court made three findings
which subsequently have become known as the hallmarks of the
Howey test.
First, grouping the parcels under the service contracts was essential to the profitability of the enterprise and evidenced a common enterprise. The small size of the parcels meant it was not economically
feasible to develop the plots of land individually. "Such tracts gain
utility as citrus groves only when cultivated and developed as compo7. See, e.g., Raymond Lee Org., Inc. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 36 Colo. App.
417, 543 P.2d 75 (1975); Sauer v. Hays, 36 Colo. App. 190, 539 P.2d 1343 (1975);
State v. Bull Inv. Group, Inc., 32 Conn. Supp. 279, 351 A.2d 879 (1974); Tech Resources, Inc. v. Estate of Hubbard, 246 Ga. 583, 272 S.E.2d 314 (1980); Dunwoody
Country Club v. Fortson, 243 Ga. 236, 253 S.E.2d 700 (1979); Comm'r of Sec. v.
Hawaii Mkt. Center, 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971); Ronnett v. Am. Breeding
Herds, Inc., 124 Ill. App. 3d 842, 464 N.E.2d 1201 (1984); Condux v. Neldon, 83 Ill.
App. 3d 575, 404 N.E.2d 523 (1980); Jost v. Locke, 65 Or. App. 704, 673 P.2d 545
(1983); Searsy v. Commercial Trading Corp., 560 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. 1977); Payable
Accounting Corp. v. McKinley, 667 P.2d 15 (Utah 1983); Christgard, Inc. v. Christensen, 29 Wash. App. 18, 627 P.2d 136 (1981); Gaudina v. Haberman, 644 P.2d 159
(Wyo. 1982). But see Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d
906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961) (developed risk capital test); State ex rel. Park v. Glen
Turner Enterprises, [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) T 71,023
(D. Ct. Idaho Mar. 28, 1972); State ex rel. Healy v. Consumer Business System, 5 Or.
App. 19, 482 P.2d 549 (1971).
8. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
9. Id. at 298-99.
10. Id. at 294-95.
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nents of a large area. A common enterprise managed by (the company) ... is therefore essential if the investors are to achieve their
paramount aim of a return on their investments."" Second, the promoters managed, controlled and operated the enterprise. Through the
promoter's service company, the promoters effectively controlled the
cultivation and development of eighty-five percent of the groves, as
well as the harvesting and marketing of crops grown on these parcels.' 2 Third, the investors injected their capital into the venture with
the expectation of sharing the earnings and profits. As the Court
noted, the promoters offered the investment opportunity to persons
residing in distant localities and lacking the requisite equipment and
experience necessary to profitably cultivate, harvest, and market citrus
products. "Such persons have no desire to occupy the land or develop
it themselves; they13are attracted solely by the prospects of a return on
their investment."'
The Court has subsequently modified the literal scope of Howey
by incorporating an "economic realities" standard into the Howey
test, focusing on the Howey Court's admonition that the definition of
an investment contract "embodies a flexible, rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others
on the promise of profits."' 14 The Court invoked this flexible standard
to modify the Howey test in United Housing Foundation,Inc. v. Forman. 15 Later Supreme Court decisions have relied upon Howey and
11. Id. at 300.
12. Eighty-five percent of the acreage sold under the Howey scheme was covered
by service contracts with the promoter's service company, "Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc." Id. at 295.
13. Id. at 299-300.
14. Id. at 299. The Court had developed the "economic realities" standard several years before it announced the Howey test. In Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. C.M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943), the defendant sold assignments of oil
leases, representing that it would drill a test well on the leased land. The Court found
that the leaseholds were part of an oil exploration enterprise which was "woven into
these leaseholds. in both an economic and a legal sense; the undertaking to drill a well
runs through the whole transaction as the thread on which everybody's beads were
strung." Id. at 348. In determining whether the interests sold were investment contracts within the meaning of federal securities laws, the Court stated, "The test. . . is
what character the instrument is given in commerce by the terms of the offer, the plan
of distribution, and the economic inducements held out to the prospect." Id. at 35253. The Court concluded that the scheme was an investment contract since, in reality,
the defendant was selling the chance to participate in an investment enterprise. See
also Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) ("in searching for the meaning
and scope of the word 'security' in the [Securities Act of 1933], form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on economic reality").
15. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
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Forman's modification of the Howey test to determine whether an investment contract exists.
In Forman, the Court stated that an investment contract is "an
investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation
of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts
of others."' 16 Looking to the "economic realities" of the transaction,
the Forman Court found that no investment contract existed within a
scheme in which tenants in a government subsidized cooperative housing development purchased stock in the development. Even though
the tenants purchased an instrument called "stock," the Court held
that in economic reality the instrument was not a security because it
did not have the usual attributes of a security; the tenants had
purchased it to secure housing, rather than to derive economic gain in
the form of profits from the efforts of others. 17 Since the requisite
"reasonable expectation of profits" element was not present, the Court
18
held the stock was not an investment contract.
While the Supreme Court has elaborated on the common enterprise and expectation of profits components of the Howey test, it has
not focused on the requirements that the profits arise "solely" from
the efforts of others. 19 Other federal and state courts have attempted
to define this term. Recognizing that the securities laws were enacted
to protect unwary investors from fraudulent schemes, the Ninth Circuit has led the circuit courts in broadening the definition of an investment contract through a new interpretation of the Howey test. In
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Glen W. Turner Enterprises,
Inc., 20 the Ninth Circuit decided "the word 'solely' should not be read
as a strict or literal limitation on the definition of an investment contract."' 2 1 Instead, the court adopted what has since been labeled the
16. Id. at 852 (quoting Howey's "solely" language merely for reference purposes).
17. Id. at 851. The Court noted the usual attributes of a security as consisting of
the following: right to receive dividends, negotiability, right to pledge, voting rights,
ability to appreciate in value. Id.
18. Id. at 854.
19. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1978).
Subsequent federal circuit court decisions and commentators, however, have disparaged the Howey Court's language that profits must come "solely" from the efforts of
the promoter. See, eg., Bauer v. Planning Group, Inc., 669 F.2d 770, 779 (D.C. Cir.
1981); Piambino v. Bailey, 610 F.2d 1306, 1317-18 (5th Cir. 1980); Parvin v. Davis Oil
Co., 527 F.2d 112, 116 (9th Cir. 1975); Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., 494
F.2d 414, 416-17 (8th Cir. 1974); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 692-93 (3d
Cir. 1973); Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Glen W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); Hentzner v. State, 613 P.2d 821 (Alaska
1980); Note, SecuritiesRegulation Incident to CertificatesofDeposit and PrivatelyNegotiatedAgreements: Departuresfrom a Functionally OperativeSecurity Definition, 62
NEB. L. REV. 579, 586 n.40 (1983); Annot. 47 A.L.R. 3d 1375, 1379 (1973).
20. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
21. Id. at 482. The Turner court based its decision not to interpret the Howey test
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"profits test." This test looks to "whether the efforts made by those

other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those esefforts which affect the failure or success of the
sential managerial
22
enterprise."
Applying the profits test, the Turner court found an investment

contract in a multi-level distributorship scheme in which investors
were induced to purchase distributorships entitling them to finder's
23
fees or commissions for each investor-distributor they recruited.
The Turner court found two elements of the Howey test present,
namely, an investment of money and a common enterprise. 24 Because
the investors had to convince others to purchase distributorships
before they could realize a return on their investments, the profits
'2 5
could not be said to have come "solely from the efforts of others.
Nevertheless, the court found an investment contract present because
26
the "undeniably significant efforts" were made by the promoters.
Although the Supreme Court has recognized the Ninth Circuit's

profits test, it has never directly ruled on the test's validity. Two years
after Turner, in Forman, the Court recognized the profits test, but did
not adopt it.27 In a footnote, the Forman Court noted the Ninth Cir-

cuit's rejection of "solely" as an unduly restrictive limitation on the
however,
definition of an investment contract. 28 The Court declined,
29
to express a view on the Ninth Circuit's formulation.

The Ninth Circuit's formulation of the Howey test found in Turner has been adopted by both the Fifth Circuit3" and the Alaska
literally on the Howey Court's "admonition that the definition of securities should be
a flexible one," and on the remedial nature of the securities laws. Id. Similarly, Turner is consistent with the Forman Court's emphasis on the economic realities of a
scheme; both courts recognized that since the securities laws are remedial legislation,
they must be construed broadly in order to effectuate their purpose of protection of
investors.
22. Id. See also Noa v. Key Futures, Inc., 638 F.2d 77, 79 (9th Cir. 1980); Smith
v. Gross, 604 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1979); Parvin, 524 F.2d at 116; Bitter v. Hoby's
Int'l, Inc., 498 F.2d 183, 184-85 (9th Cir. 1974).
23. For a discussion of the scheme involved in Turner, see Hannan & Thomas,
supra note 1, at 233-35.
24. Turner, 474 F.2d at 481-82. The court defined a common enterprise as "one
in which the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and dependent upon the
efforts and success of those seeking the investment or of third parties." Id. at 482 n.7.
25. Id. at 482.
26. Id.
27. 421 U.S. 837, 852 n.16 (1975).
28. Id.
29. Id
30. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473
(5th Cir. 1974). For a discussion of Fifth Circuit decisions which have applied the
profits test, see Centner, Retained Equities of Agricultural Cooperatives and the Federal SecuritiesActs, 31 U. KAN. L. Rev. 245, 263-64 (1983).
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Supreme Court.3 1 The Alaska Supreme Court, however, has liberalized the Ninth Circuit's profits test, and thereby broadened the reach
of Alaska's securities laws.
III.

THE

ALASKA INVESTMENT CONTRACT TEST

Since 1980, Alaska courts on three occasions have considered
whether particular investment schemes constituted investment con32
tracts and, hence, securities for purposes of Alaska's Blue Sky laws.
In accordance with the Ninth Circuit's profits test, Alaska courts have
found an investment contract whenever an investor has invested in a
common enterprise with the expectation of profits and "the efforts
made by those other than the investor are the undeniably significant
ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or suc'33
cess of the enterprise.
A. Hentzner v. State
The Alaska Supreme Court first considered whether an investment scheme constituted a security for purposes of Alaska's Blue Sky
laws in Hentzner v. State.34 The promoter in Hentzner had advertised
in Alaska newspapers, offering investors "[a] chance to double and
even triple [their] money within the next six to eight months. 3 5 The
promoter intended to use solicited funds to mine gold that he would
then deliver to the investors. An investment of eighty dollars would
entitle the investor to one ounce of gold, provided the promoter struck
36
gold.
The court found that Hentzner's scheme involved an investment
contract under the modified Howey test developed by the Ninth Circuit in Turner. First, a common enterprise existed because the investors' financial interests were "inextricably interwoven" with those of
31. Hentzner v. State, 613 P.2d 821, 824 (Alaska 1980).
32. See supra note 2. Alaska's Blue Sky definition of a security is defined in pertinent part supra, text accompanying notes 3-4.
33. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Glen W. Turner Enterprises, 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
34. 613 P.2d 821 (Alaska 1980). Hentzner involved the petitioner's conviction on
two counts of offering and two counts of selling unregistered and non-exempt securities in violation of ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.070 (1980). The court reversed the convictions, holding that section 45.55.210(a) required a finding of intent or awareness of
wrongdoing. Since the jury was not instructed properly on the requirement of conscious wrongdoing, reversible error was committed. See 613 P.2d at 828-29.
Although Hentzner was a criminal case, the definition of a security is the same in both
criminal and civil state statutes. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.130(12) (1980) (statute
governs both civil and criminal cases).
35. 613 P.2d at 822 n.2.
36. Id. at 822.
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the promoter or third parties. 37 The investors' money was to be
pooled to enable the promoter to buy mining equipment and supplies.
In addition, the court thought that the advertisement's reference to a
"1% chance of failure" plainly implied that a mining failure would
result in no return on the investment. 38 Second, the investors expected
profits to come from the efforts of others. The court stated that the
efforts to extract
investors' continuing dependence on the promoter's
39
gold satisfied the "efforts of others" requirement.
The court distinguished the Hentzner gold mining scheme from
the more common transaction where an investor purchases gold with
the hope that its price will rise. The latter would not usually be regarded as an investment contract because the expected return on the
investment does not depend on the seller's managerial efforts. 40 In
contrast, the Hentzner promoters were engaged in significant managerial efforts because the success or failure of the venture depended upon
their efforts to arrange for the physical extraction of gold from the
4
ground. 1
The court, in determining that Hentzner had made the essential
managerial efforts necessary to constitute an investment contract,
failed to consider a potentially important distinction between the conduct of the Hentzner investors and that of other investors. At least
one commentator has suggested that the importance of the Howey
test's requirement of "solely from the efforts of the promoter or third
party" is to distinguish whether the investor has exercised managerial
control over the venture, rather than merely undertaking the physical
efforts required to complete the transaction. 42 This distinction rests
upon the traditional elements of a security: an investor places his
money or capital with a promoter, the promoter represents that the
investor will recognize a gain on this investment, and the investor relinquishes control over the methods through which the gain will be
37. Id. at 824. The Ninth Circuit had previously developed this formulation of
the common enterprise element. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Commodity Options
Int'l, Inc., 553 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1977); Turner, 474 F.2d at 482 n.7.
38. Hentzner, 613 P.2d at 824.
39. Id.

40. Id.
41. First, the court stated, "Add to the buyer-seller relationship a continuing dependency by the buyer on the seller's expertise and ability in managing the investment
and the efforts of others test is met." Id. In the same paragraph, the court continues,
"Since the investors were in a position of continuing dependency on Hentzner's efforts
to extract gold from the ground, the efforts of others test was satisfied." Id.
42. See generally, Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the

Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REv. 135, 145-46 (1971); see also
Hannan & Thomas, supra note 1, at 249-51.
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realized. 43 In other words, the promoter is expected to "manage" the
investment. The usual purchase of goods to be delivered in the future,
on the other hand, does not require managerial efforts by the seller.
The purchaser gives his money to the seller, expecting that the seller
will undertake whatever physical efforts are necessary to procure the
goods and deliver them to the purchaser. In determining whether
Hentzner's scheme constituted an investment contract or merely a
purchase of goods, therefore, the court should have scrutinized the
investors' efforts more carefully to discern whether their efforts were
merely physical and not managerial.
Other state court decisions in the Ninth Circuit provide a framework for analyzing the efforts of the promoter in Hentzner. In McClellan v. Sandholm,44 the Washington Supreme Court considered a
scheme in which promoters sold bars of silver bullion to investors.
The promoters represented that they would select the silver, store the
bars, and resell the silver at the investor's request for a commission.
In addition, the promoters said they would continue to advise the investors regarding the fluctuations of the silver market. 45
Using the same test for an investment contract that was used in
Hentzner,46 the Washington Supreme Court decided that the promoter
had exercised "those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise." 4 7 According to the court, the investor had "relied totally on the expertise of the [promoter] to select and
purchase an appropriate grade and quantity of silver, arrange for its
shipment and delivery to him, and, in the future, obtain the best price
on resale."'4 8 Unlike the McClellan scheme, the Hentzner case merely
involved a promoter's representation that gold would be mined and
delivered to investors in the future. The reported facts of Hentzner did
not mention any representations by the promoter that he would either
advise investors about the gold market or sell their gold for them.
Therefore, on the face of the opinion, the promoter in Hentzner apparently did not engage in activities that would affect the ultimate return
on investments. Rather, the investors in Hentzner must have expected
43. See Hannan & Thomas, supra note 1, at 249; Long, Partnership,Limited Partnership, and Joint Venture Interests as Securities, 37 Mo. L. REv. 581, 611 (1972).
44. 89 Wash. 2d 527, 574 P.2d 371 (1978).
45. 89 Wash. 2d at 529, 574 P.2d at 372.

46. In explaining its test for finding the existence of an investment contract, the
Washington Supreme Court first articulated a modified version of the Howey test,
whether the "investor expects to reap profits from the efforts of the promoter or a
third party." Id. at 531, 574 P.2d at 373 (citations omitted). Then, the court cited the
Turner definition of "efforts of promoter or third party." See id. at 532, 574 P.2d at
374.
47. Id. (quoting Turner, 474 F.2d at 482).

48. Id.
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to engage in substantial efforts to sell their gold and realize a profit on
their investment. The Hentzner court should have scrutinized these
efforts to discern whether they constituted managerial efforts essential
to the success of the venture.
The Montana Supreme Court has also noted the significance of
the promoters' managerial efforts in determining the existence of an
investment contract. In State v. Duncan,49 promoters induced investors to enter into package-sealer contracts. The promoters sold the
investors unsealed bags. The investors then undertook the physical
efforts necessary to seal the bags. Under the contract, the investors
would reap profits from the venture when the sealed bags were sold.50
Using the Howey test as modified by Forman,5 1 the court held that the
package-sealer contracts were investment contracts. The court found
that the promoters, not the investors, had exercised the requisite managerial control. According to the court, "sealers had no voice or part
in the actual sale of the final product."5 2 Consequently, promoters
had exclusive control over the part of the venture through which the
profits were to be realized, namely, the sale of the sealed bags. In
contrast, the promoters in Hentzner had no control over the final sale
of gold on the market. The investors alone controlled the vehicle
through which final profits from the venture would be realized-the
sale of the gold.
B.

Wheeler v. State

In 1983, Alaska continued its solicitous treatment of investors in
Wheeler v. State.53 The Court of Appeals of Alaska affirmed
Wheeler's convictions for selling unregistered securities and for fraudulent sale of securities.5 4 Although the trial court had found Wheeler
guilty under both the "investment contract" and "risk capital" 55 definitions of a security, the court of appeals held the evidence sufficient
49. 181 Mont. 382, 593 P.2d 1026 (1979).
50. Id. at 394, 593 P.2d at 1032.
51. The Forman test, although similar to the test used by the Hentzner court, does
not distinguish between managerial and physical efforts. See supra text accompanying
notes 15-16. Nevertheless, the Montana court did distinguish between managerial and
physical efforts. See 181 Mont. at 394, 593 P.2d at 1032.
52. 181 Mont. at 391, 593 P.2d at 1032.
53. 659 P.2d 1241 (Alaska App. 1983).
54. Wheeler was convicted under ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.010(3) (1980) (antifraud provision); id. § 45.55.070 (1980) (prohibiting sale of unregistered securities); id.
§ 45.55.210 (1980) (imposing criminal penalties for wilfull violations of this chapter).
55. The "risk capital" definition of a security is embodied in ALASKA STAT.
§ 45.55.130(12) (1980): "'security' means [an] investment of money or money's
worth including goods furnished or services performed in the risk capital of a venture
with the expectation of some benefit to the investor where the investor has no direct
control over the interest or policy decision of the venture."
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to sustain a finding that an investment contract existed without reaching the question of how to construe the risk capital definition of a
security.
According to the investment scheme in Wheeler,56 Spectrum, a
Colorado corporation, would sell each investor a minimum of ten
vending machines. Spectrum would place a purchase order for the
machines only after the investor had paid approximately twenty percent of the total purchase price.57 Spectrum agreed to "provide the
services of experienced 'locators,' who would arrange for the machines
'5 8
to be placed in desirable, high traffic locations around Anchorage.
Spectrum also agreed to supply candy and snacks to fill the machines
at a specified price.5 9 Finally, the investors were led to believe that the
investment plan gave them exclusive selling rights to the Anchorage
territory and that Spectrum guaranteed minimum first-year net in60
come from the machines to be 110% of the initial purchase price.
After citing the Howey test, the Wheeler court applied "the flexible interpretation of the Howey standard approved by Hentzner."61
The court scrutinized the scheme in Wheeler to determine (1) whether
the investors' financial interests were "inextricably interwoven" with
those of the promoter 62 and (2) whether the acts of the investors met
63
the Turner efforts of others test.
First, the Wheeler court found that the common enterprise element existed because "investors depended on Spectrum's continued financial security to assure that the company would be capable of
fulfilling its commitments to arrange for supplies of candy at favorable
prices, to furnish both present and future financing, to make additional
machines available for future expansion, and to live up to its obligation
56. The investment scheme in Wheeler involved the sale of vending machines
under two alternative plans: Plan A and Plan B. Since the court found, however, that
Wheeler never intended to use Plan A, only Plan B will be discussed herein. See 659
P.2d at 1243.
57. Id. at 1244.

58. Id.
59. Id.

60. Id.
61. Id. at 1247.
62. Id. at 1248 (citing Hentzner, 613 P.2d at 824); Commodity Options Int'l, 553
F.2d at 634.
63. Wheeler, 659 P.2d at 1247 (quoting Turner, 474 F.2d at 482). See also
Hentzner, 613 P.2d at 824. This flexible interpretation of Howey is consistent with the
Oregon Supreme Court's decision in Pratt v. Kross, 276 Or. 483, 497, 555 P.2d 765,
773 (1976), which concluded that "the Howey test should be modified so that the
requirements are (1) an investment of money (or money's worth), (2) in a common
enterprise, (3) with the expectation of a profit, (4) to be made through the management and control of others." For a discussion of Pratt,see infra text accompanying
notes 79-83.
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under the 110% first year guarantee." 64 Similarly, the court determined that Spectrum depended upon the financial success of its investors because Spectrum assured investors it would reimburse them up
to the 110% earnings guarantee. Spectrum might, therefore, have incurred vast liability for unprofitable or even marginally profitable operations by investors. The court concluded that this financial
interdependence of 65promoter and investor supported a finding of a
common enterprise.
Second, the Wheeler court found the investment scheme satisfied
the second prong of the Howey test.66 Under Hentzner's relaxed construction of the Howey Court's language of "solely from the efforts of
the promoter," the Wheeler court found that Spectrum's activities provided the essential managerial efforts that "would ultimately determine the profitability of the venture."' 67 While the court
acknowledged that investors were required "to service and stock their
vending machines regularly, to collect money from their machines,
and to keep basic records" 68 in order to obtain profits, the court characterized these "substantial efforts" as "only routine efforts of a ministerial nature to advance their investments. '6 9 On the other hand, the
court characterized Spectrum's efforts as "managerial" since it was
responsible for:
negotiating for and obtaining high traffic locations for the machines
at nominal rates, installation of the machines on location, providing
supplies at advantageous wholesale prices to stock the machines,
providing future guidance as to relocation of machines operating at
unprofitable locations, assuring exclusive sales territory to investors,
providing financing for acquisition of machines, and making addiand locations available to investors for future
tional machines
70
expansion.
By characterizing Spectrum's efforts as "managerial" and the investors' efforts as "ministerial," the court was able to conclude "that the
'sole efforts' requirement of the Howey standard was met."' 71 Consequently, the court held that the scheme constituted an investment contract which was a "security" within the meaning of Alaska Blue Sky
72
laws.
The Wheeler decision again illustrates the Alaska courts' willingness to construe the term "investment contract" expansively. Only by
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Wheeler, 659 P.2d at 1248.
Id.
Id. at 1249.
Id.
Id.
Id.

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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expanding the Howey test and the Ninth Circuit's profits test was the
court able to produce the result it desired: protecting Alaska's investors from sham transactions initiated by out-of-state residents.
Consideration of the "solely through the efforts of others" portion
of the Howey test illustrates the expansive reach of the court's decision
in Wheeler. In this context, the distinction between managerial control and physical control becomes critical. A universal characteristic
of traditional forms of securities is that the investor loses managerial
control over his investment. 73 Consequently, the Howey court's
"solely" requirement was likely intended to distinguish between investments in which the investor exercised managerial control and investments in which managerial control remained completely in the
hands of the promoter.
Not only is this interpretation consistent with Howey itself, it also
comports with the traditional notion of a security. For example, an
investment in a franchise chain such as McDonald's would not be an
investment contract if the franchisee depended upon his own efforts
for the success of his franchise rather than upon the efforts of the
franchise system's promoters. On the other hand, a court could decide
that a franchise agreement was an investment contract if the promoter
solicited franchise operators who had little money to invest and no
experience in managing or operating such an enterprise. The franchisee's inexperience, coupled with agreements mandating that he
purchase supplies exclusively from the franchisor, maintain uniform
standards of quality, and receive training from the franchisor, renders
the franchisee almost totally dependent on the franchisor. 74 Although
the franchisee exerts physical control over the day-to-day operations
of the franchise, the franchisor retains managerial control; he makes
the decisions regarding training, supplies, and quality control in the
enterprise. Securities laws were enacted to protect unsophisticated investors who, like the franchisee dependent on the franchisor's management, find themselves absorbing the financial risks of ventures
75
managed and controlled by others.
73. Long, supra note 42, at 170-71. Long's article argues that one of the principal
reasons for the enactment of the securities laws was to protect investors who do not
have a direct voice in the management and control of the enterprise, and who, therefore, are not in a position to protect their investment.
74. The Ninth Circuit has held that an agreement for a restaurant franchise was
not an investment contract where the franchisee was responsible for "continuous operation of the restaurant, production and sale of roast beef sandwiches and related products, purchase of materials, merchandise and supplies from sources selected at his sole
discretion, preparation of monthly operating statements, and employment of personnel to accomplish the foregoing." See Bittner v. Hoby's Int'l, Inc., 498 F.2d 183, 185

(9th Cir. 1974).
75. See Hannan & Thomas, supra note 1, at 254-56; see also Long, supra note 43,
at 602 n.81 and accompanying text.
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An examination of the "ministerial" duties of the investors in
Wheeler in light of this managerial/physical control dichotomy discloses that the investors' duties included both managerial and physical
control of the enterprise. The court noted that investors had to service
and stock the machines, collect money from the machines and keep
basic service and revenue records.7 6 While these efforts could be considered merely physical or "ministerial," the court failed to mention
whether the investors had undertaken any of the managerial efforts
essential to the profitability of the venture. Although Spectrum helped
choose the location for the machines and provided supplies, the investors decided the type of candy or snacks to be sold, the price to charge
for these items, and whether or not to discontinue selling unprofitable
items. The selection of both the product line and the price to be
charged for the product constitutes a "managerial" decision which af77
fects the failure or success of the venture.
The Wheeler decision is also consistent with decisions by the Oregon Supreme Court recognizing that the exercise of some control by
investors will not necessarily preclude the finding of an investment
contract. 78 In Pratt v. Kross, 79 the Oregon Supreme Court decided
that a limited partnership agreement was an investment contract, even
though the plaintiff, a limited partner, was an employee of the limited
partnership.80 The Pratt court modified the Howey test's language to
read, "expectations of a profit. . . to be made through the management and control of others."8 1 The court then considered whether the
investor had exercised managerial or merely physical, ministerial efforts. According to the court, "An investor who labors without having an opportunity to participate in management is just as helpless to
govern what happens to his investment as is a purely passive investor."'8 2 Because the court determined that the plaintiff was employed
76. Wheeler, 659 P.2d at 1249.
77. It is sufficient to constitute managerial control that the investor had the right
to managerial control irrespective of whether he chooses to exercise this right. See
Long, supra note 42, at 171 n.158.
78. Furthermore, the Wheeler decision is consistent with Louisiana's interpretation of a similar vending machine sales agreement. See EK v. Nationwide Candy
Div., Ltd., 403 So.2d 780 (La. App. 1971).
79. 276 Or. 483, 555 P.2d 765 (1976).
80. According to the limited partnership agreement in Pratt,the defendant, a general partner, was to receive a "management fee" for exercising "full charge of the
management, conduct and operation of the business." Id. at 485, 555 P.2d at 766.
The plaintiff was to receive a salary for the performance of unspecified duties. In
return for her initial investment of capital, the plaintiff was entitled to share in the
profits generated by the venture. Id.
81. Id. at 497, 555 P.2d at 773. The Oregon court expressly provided for the
possibility of future modifications of its stated test in "situations in which reason
seems to so direct when the purpose of the statutory scheme is considered." Id.
82. Id.

1985]

INVESTMENT CONTRA CT

prevent
in a non-managerial position, it held that her efforts did not
83
the transaction from being labelled an investment contract.
In Marshallv. Harris,84 the Oregon Supreme Court considered a
scheme that presented a clear example of control by a promoter and
non-control by an investor. The investor purchased a "fractional interest" in a racehorse from the promoter. The court, relying on the
Howey test, held that the fractional interest was an investment conput management
tract because, inter alia, the "partnership'8 agreement
5
entirely in the hands of [the promoter].
The efforts exerted by the investors in Wheeler were clearly more
substantial than the efforts of the investors in Marshall. The investors'
efforts in Wheeler more closely approximated the efforts exerted by the
investor in Pratt,which were insufficient to avoid a finding of an investment contract. Although the Pratt court did not elaborate on the
efforts required by the investor's employment, these efforts, like the
Wheeler investors' efforts, probably were significant, but not significant enough to determine the success of the enterprise.8 6 In Wheeler,
the investors exercised managerial control over some aspects of the
venture. The Wheeler court, however, clearly disregarded the management efforts exercised by the investors. This disregard is typical of
the Alaska courts' approach to investment contract analysis.
C. American Gold & Diamond Corp. v. Kirkpatrick
American Gold & Diamond Corp. v. Kirkpatrick, 7 the Alaska
Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on transactions that
constitute investment contracts, confirms that Alaska courts have continued to apply an increasingly flexible investment contract standard.
American Gold was a Utah Corporation that sold territorial distributorships, giving investors an exclusive thirty-four year right to market
83. Id. Compare SEC SECURrriEs AcT RELEASE No. 5211 (Nov. 30, 1971). "It

must be emphasized that the assignment of nominal or limited responsibilities to the
participant does not negate the existence of an investment contract ..
84. 276 Or. 447, 555 P.2d 756 (1976).
85. Id. at 455, 555 P.2d at 761. The court also quoted 69 AM. JUR. 2D, Securities
Regulation-State § 28 (1973) which states:
One type of transaction commonly found to be a security under the blue
sky laws, often as a type of investment contract, is a transaction in which
real or personal property purportedly is sold, but where the 'seller' in fact
retains possession and control of such property and the 'buyer' obtains the
right to receive profits resulting from the management of it.
Id. at 454-55, 555 P.2d at 760-61.
86. Since the Prattcourt mentioned the plaintiff's "unspecified employment duties" in the same context as the defendant's full managerial control, it is possible that
the investor in Prattdid not exercise any managerial efforts. 276 Or. at 485, 555 P.2d
at 766.
87. 678 P.2d 1343 (Alaska 1984).
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American Gold's gold jewelry and gems in designated geographic territories.8 8 Kirkpatrick, the Director of the Division of Banking and
Securities, issued a temporary cease and desist order against American
Gold. The Kirkpatrick court affirmed the order to cease and desist
upon the grounds that American Gold's sale of the territorial distributorships constituted the sale of unregistered securities.
The court again applied the Ninth Circuit formulation of the
Howey test. It stated that the only part of the Howey test in issue was
whether American Gold's efforts provided the "essential managerial
efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise. ' 89 The
Kirkpatrickcourt reinterpreted the Ninth Circuit profits test, however,
by stating that the focal point of this test was "whether the typical
investor would accept the promoters' control." 90 In other words, if
the scheme were directed at investors whose lack of sophistication and
experience would lead them to accept the promoter's management and
control, the court would likely find that the scheme satisfied Turner's
requirement that the promoter exert significant managerial controls
affecting the success of the enterprise. Thus, the court enabled itself to
find an investment contract in a scheme where the named plaintiffs did
not actually rely on the promoter's managerial efforts, so long as a
typical investor would have been likely to rely on the promoter. 91
Reviewing the promoters' sales materials and statements, the
court decided that the territorial distributorship program was aimed at
investors seeking a passive role - investors who would want the promoters to provide substantial managerial assistance. As a result, the
court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the Director's
92
decision that the scheme constituted an investment contract.
88. Id. at 1345.
89. Id. at 1346 (quoting Turner, 474 F.2d at 482).
90. Kirkpatrick, 678 P.2d at 1346. This formulation of the Ninth Circuit test was
developed in Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 582-83
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1086 (1982) (involving sale of licenses to market dental devices in specific geographic regions).
91. Kirkpatrick, 678 P.2d at 1347. This expansion of the Ninth Circuit profits test
seems to be consistent with the Howey decision. In Howey, the investors did not have
to accept the promoter's management contract; in fact, fifteen percent of them did not
accept it. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 295 (1946).
Apparently, the Howey Court was satisfied that a typical investor would have accepted
the promoter's management contract because the Court did not discuss the fact that

not all investors had actually relied on the promoter's control and management.

92. Kirkpatrick, 678 P.2d at 1347. The court pointed to several factors which
supported the court's finding of an investment contract. First, promotional materials
stressed the tax benefits of the scheme. Second, the promoters agreed to supply gems
to investors at a discounted price. Third, the promoters represented that they had the
requisite connections and selling expertise to ensure profitability. Moreover, the promoters agreed to "provide education and sales materials, attempt to secure the distributor a business license and insurance, assist with the selection of personnel, distribute
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The Kirkpatrick decision epitomizes the increasingly liberal standard under which the Alaska courts have scrutinized investment
schemes. Recognizing that state and federal securities laws were enacted to protect unsophisticated investors, the court reduced the Ninth
Circuit profits test to one question - whether "promoters sought to
attract passive investors, the persons whom the securities laws [were]
designed to protect. ' 93 The fact that the court did not even consider
whether the efforts exerted by the investor were ministerial or managerial evidences the extreme flexibility of the standard espoused by the
court. Moreover, regardless of whether the promotions were aimed at
passive investors, the court failed to consider that the investors had at
least the legal right to control many "essential managerial" decisions, 94 whether or not they chose to exercise this right. Had the court
adopted a more rigid application of the Ninth Circuit profits test,
rather than merely seeking a means to justify a result, it likely would
not have found an investment contract because the investors had the
right to control essential managerial decisions which would affect the
failure or success of the enterprise.
IV.

THE RISK CAPITAL TEST

The Alaska courts' increasing liberality in applying the Ninth
Circuit profits test to justify desired results suggests that the court is
not actually adhering to a "test" at all. The court could apparently
abandon the tests cited in Hentzner, Wheeler, and Kirkpatrick and still
reach the same result. The court should not, however, unnecessarily
sacrifice predictability to produce equitable results. Both of these
goals can be achieved under an alternate approach to the determination of whether an investment scheme is a security - the "risk capital" test.
Although the Howey test as modified by subsequent decisions provides a framework for courts to analyze investment schemes, its structured terms cannot encompass all of the schemes that the securities
acts were designed to prohibit. Consequently, many courts, including
the Alaska Supreme Court, have stretched the narrow Howey test in
an attempt to fulfill the purposes of the securities acts: prevention of
fraud and protection of the public from transactions in which promoters solicit risk capital from the public. 9 5 Because the Howey Court did
catalogues and solicitation materials to potential buyers, and generally advise and educate the distributor on how to run the business." Id. at 1345.
93. Id. at 1347.
94. See, e.g., State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 647, 485 P.2d 105,

109 (1971).
95. See Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security" Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 W. RS. L. REv. 367, 376-77 (1967).
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not leave room for expansion in the express language of its test, subsequent courts have had to ignore the express terms of the Howey test in
order to expand its application. In Alaska, as in other states, the expansion accomplished by disregarding the express language of the
Howey test has rendered the "test" meaningless. As a result, attorneys
can no longer accurately predict how the Alaska courts will construe a
particular transaction.
To remedy problems caused by the narrow language of the Howey
test, the Ninth Circuit has developed an alternate test to discern
whether a scheme is an investment contract: the risk capital test. The
"risk capital" test encompasses transactions that in economic reality
are of the type the Howey Court sought to regulate. Courts utilizing
the risk capital test scrutinize a transaction to see if promoters are
soliciting risk capital, the capital necessary to finance a scheme, from
passive investors in order to develop a profitable business for
96
themselves.
The risk capital test was first employed by the California Supreme
Court in Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski.97 Silver Hills involved a
partnership that sought to fund the development of a golf and country
club through the sale of "memberships." The purchase of a "membership" entitled the buyer to use of the club facilities. The venture was
grossly undercapitalized. Pursuant to a contract to purchase a seventy-five thousand dollar parcel of real estate where they could locate
the country club, the promoters gave a four hundred dollar down payment; memberships were expected to cover the balance of the contract
price, as well as an additional one hundred, sixty-five thousand dollars
98
in construction costs.
Since the purchasers were not led to expect monetary profits, a
literal application of the Howey test would have denied investment
contract status to this scheme. The Silver Hills court, however, decided that the investment scheme fell within the "regulatory purpose"
of the Blue Sky laws, which is "[t]o afford those who risk their capital
at least a fair chance of realizing their objectives in legitimate ventures
whether or not they expect a return on their capital in one form or
another." 99 The court recognized that the lack of a profit motive
should not shield promoters from regulation by the securities laws if
they attempt to finance their ventures by soliciting risk capital from
96. See, e.g., Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906,
13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961); State v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105
(1971); Pratt v. Kross, 276 Or. 483, 555 P.2d 765 (1976).
97. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961).
98. Id. at 812-13, 361 P.2d at 906-07, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 186-87. For a discussion of
Silver Hills, see Hannan & Thomas, supra note 1, at 231.
99. Silver Hills, 55 Cal. 2d at 815, 361 P.2d at 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89; see
Hannan & Thomas, supra note 1, at 232.
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investors who are not given significant managerial control over the
venture.
State courts in Oregon and Hawaii have also adopted the Ninth
Circuit's risk capital test. In State v. ConsumerBusinessSystem, 1oo the
Oregon Court of Appeals held that the Howey test is not the exclusive
means for determining the existence of an investment contract, and
adopted the risk capital test for use with schemes that the Howey test
could not accurately evaluate.
Consumer Business involved a franchise distributorship scheme
where a franchisee would build an organization of managers and representatives. The franchisee, managers and representatives would sell
subscriptions to businesses which agreed to display a Consumer Business System, Inc. ("CBS") card at their place of business. In return,
CBS agreed to list the business' services or products in Consumer
Buyer's Guide without charge. 10 1 Scrutinizing the efforts required by
the investor, the court noted, "If a franchisee purchases a franchise,
and then does nothing, it is understood that he will not make profits.' 0 2 Since the efforts of the investors were essential to the profitability of the venture, the court could not follow the express language
of Howey requiring an expectation of profits solely from the efforts of
others. Instead, the Oregon court scrutinized the transaction to determine whether the promoter depended upon the investors' capital to
initiate his operations. The court stated its formulation of the risk
capital test for franchise agreements as follows: "if a substantial portion of the investment capital which a franchisor uses to initiate its
operations is being provided by the franchisees, then the franchisor
10 3
must register his enterprise under the [state] Securities Act."
100. 5 Or. App. 19, 482 P.2d 549 (1971).
101. Id. at 21-22, 482 P.2d at 550-51.
102. Id. at 25, 482 P.2d at 552.
103. Id. at 29, 482 P.2d at 554. The Prattcourt had also stated that "An interest
comes within [the risk capital] test if the investor contributes the capital necessary to
finance the enterprise and receives in exchange the right to some benefit." 276 Or. at
490, 555 P.2d at 769.
The Ninth Circuit has listed six factors to determine whether a "commercial
loan" is actually an investment contract: (1) time; (2) collateralization; (3) form of the
obligation; (4) circumstances of issuance; (5) relationship between the amount borrowed and the size of the borrower's business; (6) the contemplated use of the funds.
See AMFAC Mtg. Corp. v. Arizona Mall of Tempe, 583 F.2d 426, 432 (9th Cir.
1978); see also United Cal. Bank v. THC Fin. Corp., 557 F.2d 1351, 1358 (9th Cir.
1977); Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1257-58 (9th Cir. 1976).
Compare the ConsumerBusiness risk capital test for franchises set out in the text with
Idaho's formulation:
A security would be said to be present if the following could be found:
1. a common enterprise,
2. expectation of monetary profit or some other benefit and,
3. either (a) non-participation or (b) a double-investment situation
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In State Commission of Securities v. Hawaii Market Center,
Inc., 10 4 the Hawaii Supreme Court held that a selling scheme in which
investors were led to expect profits through the solicitation of other
investors constituted an investment contract. In reaching its decision,
the court discarded the Howey test because "it has led courts to analyze investment projects mechanically, based on a narrow concept of
investor participation." 10 5 In particular, the court noted that the
Supreme Court "has not yet decided whether an investment plan involving non-managerial investor participation also falls within the
concept of an investment contract security." 10 6 In light of this fact,
the Hawaii court adopted107a risk venture capital test developed by Professor Ronald J. Coffey.
Professor Coffey has suggested that a court should find an investment contract in transactions in which the buyer furnishes initial value
to the promoter and part of this initial value is "subjected to the risks
of [the] enterprise." 10 8 A court also should determine whether the
buyer is either unfamiliar with the operation of the enterprise, or
"does not receive the right to participate in the management of the
enterprise." 1 09 Finally, the court should consider whether the promoter induced the buyer to furnish the initial value through representations that the buyer could reasonably expect to receive a "valuable
benefit of some kind."' 10 Applying Professor Coffey's test to the facts
of Hawaii Market Center, the Hawaii court held that the transaction
constituted an investment contract."1 '
The Alaska Supreme Court should follow other states in the
Ninth Circuit and adopt the risk capital test as an alternative to the
Howey test and its progeny. The application of the risk capital test
would be consistent with Alaska's decisions in Hentzner, Wheeler, and
Kirkpatrick Moreover, the Alaska Blue Sky law expressly recognizes
as a security an "investment of money . . . in the risk capital of a
venture with the expectation of some benefit to the investor where the
investor has no direct control over the investment or policy decision of
where there is a contribution of risk capital, as well as non-participation
in the franchisor's separate business.
State ex rel. Park v. Glen Turner Enterprises, [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY
L. REP. (CCH) %71,023 (D. Idaho Mar. 29, 1972). The Idaho court referred to its
formulation as a combination of Howey and Silver Hills.
104. 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
105. Id.at 647, 485 P.2d at 108.
106. Id. at 647 n.3, 485 P.2d at 108 n.3.
107. See Coffey, supra note 95, at 377.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Hawaii Mkt. Center, 52 Hawaii at 649-52, 485 P.2d at 109-11.
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the venture. ' 12 Therefore, adopting the risk capital test would provide the Alaska courts with a viable alternative to the Howey test and
allow the court to apply that test only to transactions that the Howey
language and the Turner modifications thereof can comfortably reach.
The Howey test is particularly hard to apply if the profits expected by the investor are difficult to identify and assess.1 13 Similar
problems arise where the transaction does not actually "subject any of
the buyer's initial value to the risks of an enterprise."'1 14 Furthermore,
the Howey test is especially difficult to apply where the investor exerts
some managerial control over the venture, because neither the Howey
test nor its progeny have quantified the amount of managerial control
that an investor may exercise before a scheme will be deemed an investment contract. If the transactions involved in such cases violate
the spirit of the securities acts but do not fit within the narrow language of the Howey test, the court could analyze the transaction using
the risk capital theory. Use of both tests would allow the Alaska
courts to fulfill the remedial purposes of the securities acts while en115
hancing the predictability of their decisions.
For example, in Hentzner, at the time he sought out the investors,
the promoter did not have the gold in his possession. Therefore, investors risked their capital on the possibility that the promoter would
never discover gold. Consequently, if the Hentzner court had applied
the risk capital test, it still would have found an investment contract.
The court would have reached this decision, however, without attempting to distinguish between the "managerial" and "physical" efforts of the promoter and the investors.
Wheeler and Kirkpatrick also posed problems in the application
of the Howey test because both cases involved transactions where investors had to exert some managerial effort in order to reap profits
from the venture. The investors' exercise of managerial control raises
troublesome questions regarding the meaning of the "solely through
112. See Alaska Securities Act of 1959, ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.130(12) (1980).
113. See Coffey, supra note 95, at 383.
114. Id. at 384.
115. For example, in In re Western Pacific Coin & Silver Exchange, [1971-1978
Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP.(CCII) t 71,203 (Jan. 23, 1975), the Iowa Commissioner of Insurance applied the risk capital test to a transaction similar to the
Hentzner scheme. In Western Pacific, promoters solicited money and, in return, investors received an invoice for silver bullion or silver coins as an "investment for
profit." Id. at 67,735. After first conducting a cursory analysis of the transaction
under the Howey test, the court applied the risk capital test. Id. at 67,736. The court
found that Western Pacificbuyers risked losing venture capital because "Western apparently did not have the contracted commodity in vault or on hand and therefore
risked the investor's money on the open market." Id. The court then concluded that
the invoices were investment contracts and thus securities within the meaning of Iowa
Blue Sky laws. Id.
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the efforts of others" component of the Howey test. Using the risk
capital test would have alleviated these problems, while allowing the
court to reach the same result. Indeed, both Wheeler and Kirkpatrick
involved transactions where promoters sought to fund their own
profit-making venture with the capital of arguably uninformed and unsophisticated investors. In addition, the ventures involved "risk capital" because the court determined that the investors were never
guaranteed a return on the investment unless the promoter himself
made a profit. Therefore, if the venture failed, the investor lost
everything.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's test for an investment contract, as developed by the Howey Court, has been subsequently modified by the federal circuit courts, including a particularly significant modification by
the Ninth Circuit. In Securities Exchange Commission v.Glen W.
Turner Enterprises, the Ninth Circuit articulated a flexible version of
the Howey test. This modification evidences the narrowness of the language used in Howey and the resultant need to stretch this test to uphold the purpose of the securities acts - protection of unsophisticated
investors.
By stretching the Turner profits test, the Alaska courts have
moved themselves one step further from the Howey standard. While
broadening the sweep of Alaska's Blue Sky laws, the courts have made
it increasingly difficult for attorneys to plan or review transactions because the boundaries of the "tests" invoked by the courts are now
unclear.
Adoption of a risk capital test would allow the Alaska courts to
achieve the results they desire and provide clearer rationales for their
decisions. Using the risk capital test as an alternative to the Howey
test would enable the courts to continue finding an investment contract whenever the economic realities of the transaction indicate that a
security is involved, even though the literal terms of Howey cannot be
satisfied. This alternative test would enhance the predictability of the
courts' decisions because the courts would not have to stretch the
Howey test beyond meaningful application. Consequently, Alaska
would have two distinct tests for an investment contract: a risk venture capital theory and a test based upon Howey and modifications
thereof developed by the Ninth Circuit. The courts could develop a
consistent analysis under each test, and apply each in the appropriate
circumstances.
Nancy K Jones

